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Abstract. The activities of the UN Security Council after the 11 September attacks 
provided subject for an extensive theoretic debate on the ongoing ‘transformation’ of 
international law. Whether and how much international terrorism constitutes a new (legal) 
threat and whether the current system of international law is appropriate to respond to 
these threats, has been analysed in many studies. 
 However, another aspect also deserves an in-depth examination; two resolutions of 
the UN Security Council [1373 (2001) and 1540(2004)] imposing general-abstract legal 
obligations, including the obligation to adopt certain domestic legal norms, for all the 
member States of the UN. That is to say, for the first time, the Security Council assumed 
legislative powers, practically, for the whole membership. Nevertheless, so far the 
adoption of legislative measures remained rather exceptional, the issue shall not be left 
ignored. The study focuses on the basic question, namely whether the Security Council 
has the power to adopt legislative measures - on the established basis of the notion of 
‘legislation’.  
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Introduction 
 
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, many scholars were of the 
view, that mankind has arrived at a historical landmark–the beginning of a new 
(political and security) era.1  
 One may plausibly state that the real effects of the events can be measured 
through the (legal) responses given to the challenges they cause. Without aiming 
to provide an exhaustive overview of all the specific actions taken,2 one shall 
  
 ∗ Legal Adviser, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Hungary.  
E-mail: veghk@freemail.hu  
 1 See, e.g.: Heisbourg, F.: The war against terrorism and the transformation of the world 
order: a European view. In: Emerson, M.–Becher, K. (eds.): The war against terrorism and 
the transformation of the world order. Brussels, 2002. 
 2 For a broad overview see: Kovács, P.: The United Nations in the fight against 
international terrorism. Sectio Juridica et Politica Miskolc, Tomus XXI/2. 421–434; 
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take into account the individual responses of States–recognizing a (somewhat 
odd) case of the right of States to self-defence; the collective responses of 
regional and universal international organisations–including the invoking of 
Article V of the North-atlantic Treaty by NATO and the several resolutions 
adopted by the UN Security Council. 
 Examining Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001),3 one of the first, and 
perhaps most significant resolutions of the Security Council in response to the 
attacks, most of the authors accentuate the substantive measures to combat 
terrorist financing. Apart from those substantive measures, there is another, 
perhaps less conspicuous, aspect not strictly linked to the previous one, that 
undoubtedly constitutes a novelty in the practice of the Security Council, or–as 
Paul C. Szasz noted–where the Security Council obviously “broke new ground”.4  
 For the first time since its establishment, the Security Council imposed 
abstract legal obligations on all the member States. Therefore, from another 
point of view, the real novelty by the Security Council in Resolution 1373, is, 
that it acts unbound by a specific situation or conflict (though, the political 
backgrounds were and are obvious) and establishes general legal obligations 
on States for the future. This, according to most of the authors on the topic, 
constitutes an international legislative action, i.e. the Security Council, on its 
own initiative, makes new international legal norms binding on all States, 
irrespective their consent.  
 However, the enactment of ‘legislative measures’ by the Security Council 
did not remain an exceptional action desired by a particular moment, whereas 
in 2004, Resolution 1540 (2004)5 again imposed general legal obligations on 
States, at that time, concerning the fight against the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Moreover, the latter resolution goes further into the domain 
of State sovereignty, insofar as it imposes a detailed obligation for States to 
enact domestic laws and administrative measures, which may directly concern 
the rights of natural or legal persons in their own countries. Although their 
subjects are different, there is a clear relationship between the resolutions; 
Resolution 1540 (2004) can obviously be deemed as a continuation of a process 
                                                      
Jimeno-Bulnes, M.: After September 11th: the fight against terrorism in national and 
European law. Substantive and procedural rules: some examples. European Law Journal, 
10 (2004) 235. 
 3 S/RES/1373 (2001), adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on 28 
September 2001. 
 4 Szasz, P. C.: The Security Council starts legislating. American Journal of Inter-
national Law, 96 (2002) 901. 
 5 S/RES/1540 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 
April 2004. 
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begun with Resolution 1373 (2001), broadening the Security Council’s instruments 
in the maintenance of international peace and security, however, there is only an 
indirect reference to the previous resolution. Instead, as a much broader, but 
more meaningful background, Resolution 1540 (2004) refers back to an earlier 
statement (and not resolution!) of the Security Council, adopted at the meeting 
on 31 January 1992 held “at the level of Heads of State and Government”.6 
The importance of this reference lies within that this statement is today commonly 
known as the promulgation of the Security Council’s aim to enhance and broaden 
its own responsibility and powers in order to meet the new challenges of the post-
cold war era. Beside that, as an equally important element, the referred statement 
is the first manifestation of the broad interpretation of international security.7 
 Consequently, the ‘legislative measures’ taken, albeit novels in the practice 
of the Security Council, are obviously not without any antecedents; therefore, 
further examples also cannot be excluded. However, it shall be added that the 
referred statement cannot be seen as a precedent in the legal but only in the 
political sense. 
 There may be as many arguments pro, as contra a legislative power of the 
Security Council. But, is the absence of an expressed prohibition on legislation 
a convincing argument in itself, or is it essential to provide at least an implied 
attribution of powers? Inasmuch as the UN Charter is constantly claimed to be 
a “living instrument”,8 the answer cannot be given properly without examining 
the legal influence of the subsequent practice of the Security Council and the 
position of the member States. After all, if the questions on the details can 
somehow be answered, the general issue may, however, remain: is the legislative 
power of the Security Council compatible with its proper role, or, more 
  
 6 S/23500, 31 January 1992, Note by the President of the Security Council. 
 7 “[…] The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself 
ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the 
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and 
security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate 
bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters. […]” Ibid., 
perational para. 10. 
 8 See also: Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, International Court of Justice, Case 
concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 27 February 1998, ICJ Reports, 1998. 80. [Hereinafter referred to 
as ‘Lockerbie Case’]. Professor Thomas M. Franck’s opinion on the UN Charter as a 
“living tree”, cited in: Malone, D. M.: The Security Council in the post-cold war era: A 
study in the creative interpretation of the UN Charter. New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics, 35 (2003) 487. 
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broadly, with the constitutional order of the United Nations? Can it transfer 
itself from an essentially political organ to the position of a law-making body? 
 
 
I. The Meaning of ‘Legislation’ for the Purpose of the Study 
 
One shall see that eventually the essence of the problem concerning the 
contents of a legislative power does lie within the interpretation of the term 
‘legislation’; however, admitting that this is not simply a semantic question.  
 On the one hand, the broad interpretation of the notion, proceeding from 
the specific nature of the international legal system, considers legislation as 
equal with general law-making processes. From that perspective, the two terms 
are deemed synonyms, both referring to the adoption and enactment of any new 
norm or rule of international law. Hence, legislation receives a new, independent 
meaning in the international plane, only applicable within that system. 
 On the other hand, the narrow interpretation, through an analogy with 
domestic legal theory, treats legislation as a unique form of the general law-
making processes beside treaty-making and the creation of customary inter-
national law. While in the broad interpretation rules enacted through legislative 
processes become general sources of international law, as those in Article 38 
of the Statute of the ICJ, in the narrow interpretation, legislative acts become 
sui generis sources of international law. 
 For the purposes of the present study, legislation shall mean the adoption 
of binding resolutions by international organizations with general-abstract 
subject-matter and addressees (regarding member States; irrespective their 
consent), setting out legal obligations for a defined or undefined future period 
of time. As the necessity or validity of two further elements may be disputed, I do 
not include the requirements of an expressed authorization in the constituting 
treaty and a clear-cut determination of procedural rules.  
 
 
II. A Legislative Power of the Security Council? – Pros and Cons in a 
Critical Analysis 
 
In the international literature concerning the legislative powers of the Security 
Council, there are several opinions and arguments both pro and contra the 
existence of such powers. Among them there are views e.g. that the Council 
lacks the expressed power for legislation and there are also opinions for the 
opposite; others argue that the Council may have at least an implied legislative 
power, while others bring up the unsuitability of the Council for acting as a 
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legislature. Moreover, there are also authors arguing that a legislative power of 
the Council would impair the basic principles of international law.  
 Most of these views can be originated in the general attitudes regarding the 
role and functions of the Security Council. 
 
1. Absence of an Expressed Prohibition v. a Need for an Expressed  
 Authorization 
 
The core problem of this section might be tersely formulated in two questions. 
Firstly, is there a need for an expressed attribution of legislative powers in the 
Charter as a prerequisite of legitimacy? Secondly, can the terms concerning 
the Security Council’s general or specific powers be interpreted plausibly in 
a way to include a legislative power? Authors are utterly divided on these 
questions. On the one hand, there are some, considering a legislative power 
for the Council almost as self-evident, however, one shall be cautious in this 
regard; the notion of ‘legislation’ often has a quite different meaning in their 
context.9 
 According to the first question, namely the requirement of an expressed 
attribution of power, one core aspect has been presented by Krzysztof Skubi-
szewski, by stating that: 
 
the organization must have an explicit and unequivocal treaty authorisation 
in order to have the competence to enact law for States by virtue of its 
resolutions. The power to make law for States cannot be founded on any 
doctrine of implicit or implied powers.10 
 
 The main reason behind it must be that–following from the horizontal 
character of the international community and sovereignty–States may only be 
bound by general international legal norms if previously they consented to be 
bound. As pointed out by the PCIJ in the SS. Lotus case:  
 
  
 9 See e.g., P. Hulsroj, P.: The legal function of the Security Council. Chinese Journal 
of International Law, 1 (2002) 59. 
 10 Skubiszewski also notes in his study that the adoption of internal law of international 
organisations may be based on implied powers. Skubiszewski, K.: A new source of the law 
of nations: resolutions of international organisations. Recueil d’ètudes de droit inter-
national – En hommage à Paul Guggenheim, Genève, 1968. 510. 
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The rules of law binding upon States emanate from their own free will ... 
Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.11 
 
 Consequently, member States of an organization may only be bound by 
legislative acts of the organization if they have previously given their consent 
to be bound, i.e. the member States have expressly attributed legislative 
powers to the organization.  
 The specific requirement that legislative powers shall be explicitly granted 
has the primary role as a safeguard against uncontrolled and perhaps too far-
fetched powers of an organization in matters seriously penetrating into the 
sovereignty of its member States. 
 On the other hand, there may be found voices, arguing that general, or, 
moreover, also implied powers of an international organization can serve the 
basis of legislative powers. In my view, basing an organization’s legislative 
powers solely on the argument that it is necessary for the fulfilment of the 
purposes and functions of the organization would be too far-fetched and lack 
legal certainty. Therefore, it is inevitable to find expressed provisions in the 
constituting document of the organization as a legal basis for legislative powers. 
 At that point, we may turn to the second question, as to whether the 
expressed powers of the Security Council include the power to legislate. It 
must be noted in advance that the text of the Charter does not refer explicitly to 
the terms ‘legislation’, ‘law-making’ or ‘legal norm’ in relation to the powers of 
the Council. However, this per se does not necessarily exclude to existence of 
legislative powers.12 It must also be added that, undoubtedly, the Council has 
the power to adopt binding measures for the member States. To begin with, 
there are several opinions–including that of the ICJ13–that the Security Council 
  
 11 The Case concerning the SS. Lotus, (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, Judgement of 7 Sept. 1927, PCIJ Ser. A. No. 10. [Hereafter: Lotus case]. 
 12 As a contrast, it might be of interest that the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community in its Article 249 expressly empowers the institutions of the organisation to 
adopt specific acts which are commonly understood as legal acts. However, this analogy 
shall be used carefully, because the EC and the UN are of entirely different nature concern-
ing their purpose and functions, and concerning the aim and effect of their acts. The 
different nature of the two legal systems is also noted in the Opinion 1/91 EEA-I of the 
ECJ, [1991] ECR I-6079. [„The Community treaties established a new legal order for the 
benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights and the subjects of which 
comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.”] 
 13 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports, 1971. 52. 
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has the power to adopt binding decisions under its general powers set out in 
Articles 24 and 25 of the UN Charter. Accepting that the Council possesses 
general powers to enact binding decisions for the maintenance of international 
peace and security–without the restrictions in Chapter VII–there cannot be seen 
any objection to expand the Council’s powers in order to cover legislation. 
However, this rather extensive interpretation would contradict the limitation in 
Article 2(7) and, more importantly, it might validly be seen too far-fetched and 
general to form the basis of legislative powers. Beside that, assuming a general 
power of the Security Council to adopt binding (also legislative) decisions 
would render the restrictions in Article 39 superfluous. In my opinion, Article 25 
cannot be interpreted to include the power of the Council to adopt legislative 
acts. Nevertheless, the specific powers of the Council under Chapter VII leave 
open a much broader space for valid interpretation. Concerning the first part of 
that specific question, namely, whether Article 39 of the UN Charter can be 
interpreted in a way to include the power of general-abstract determinations, a 
core argument may be the fact that the powers of the Council at that point have 
been left open intentionally. Applying Article 39 one may choose between the 
interpretation stating that determinations shall always be applied concerning 
one particular situation14 and the interpretation allowing a wider discretion for 
the Council.15  
 Following from the proactive or preventive nature of the notion ‘threat to 
the peace’ and the lack of any reference suggesting the limitation of such 
determination (aside the general constraints on the powers of the Council), it 
cannot be stated validly that the Council would be bound to a particular 
situation. Consequently, there is a clear and plausible interpretation of Article 39 
to include the power to make general determinations if required by the situation. 
 The second part of that particular question is whether measures to be adopted 
under Article 41 may also include general-abstract obligations applying equally 
for all member States. Here, one shall take a side whether those measures are 
essentially sanctions with one or more explicit target State or they can be 
generally enforcement measures not necessarily restricted to the form of 
sanctions but including all non-military measures the Council deems necessary 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. Neither the non-
  
 14 For this aspect see Happold, M.: Security Council Resolution 1373 and the 
Constitution of the United Nations, Leyden Journal of International Law, 16 (2003) 599. 
 15 For this opinion see e.g., Sossai, M.: UNSC Res. 1373 (2001) and International 
Law-making: A Transformation in the Nature of the Legal Obligations for the Fight 
against Terrorism? Florence, 2004. 4–5, <www.esil-sedi.org/english/pdf/Sossai.PDF> 
(visited on 19 August 2005). 
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exhaustive list provided in Article 41 nor the context of the Article suggest this 
kind of limitation, however the terms in the Article 41 are generally interpreted 
as ‘enforcement measures’, that is to say, binding, moreover, ‘coercive’ acts, 
even against the will of the member States, eventually applying equally to them. 
In that regard, in my view, the concept of ‘coercive measures’ may be seen 
as measures binding upon member States even against their will. In a more 
strict interpretation, coercive measures shall directly indicate possible counter-
measures in cases of non-compliance. It is true, that the two adopted legislative 
resolutions do not directly indicate such countermeasures. However, it does not 
necessarily exclude the possibility for the Council to adopt legislative measures 
which may indicate further sanctions if States fail to comply. 
 Consequently, it can plausibly be argued that there is not any expressed or 
implied limitation in the text of the Charter to strictly devoid the Council from 
the possibility and power to enact legislative measures. Beside that, the relevant 
provisions of the Charter do allow eventually a ‘wide’ interpretation of the 
Council’s powers to include the possibility to legislate.16 At this point, these 
determinations are nonetheless not conclusive in themselves pro a legislative 
power of the Council. On the other hand, they do indicate that the text of the 
Charter may be open for such interpretation and that legislative powers of the 
Council could eventually find their basis in specific expressed provisions of 
the Charter. 
 
2. The Possible Intentions of the Founders–Power by Necessary Implication 
 
The possible intentions of the founders of an international organization expressed 
in the travaux préparatoires and the doctrine of implied powers are by now 
generally accepted and applied not only as subsidiary but also as supplementary 
means of interpretation of specific powers of the organization. 
 It has been argued by many authors that it was not in the mind of the 
founders to create a world government with extremely wide powers, and, more 
specifically, with the power to legislate.17 The text of the travaux préparatoires 
  
 16 This view may be discovered in the statements in Dekker, I. F.–Wessel, R.: 
Governance by international organizations: rethinking the normative force of international 
decisions. In: Dekker, I. F.–Werner, W. G. (eds.): Governance and international legal 
theory. Leiden, 2004. 227. For this opinion see also Fassbender, B.: The United Nations 
Charter as constitution of the international community. Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law, 36 (1998) 574. 
 17 On the possible characterizations of the UN see Ross, A.: Constitution of the United 
Nations–Analysis of structure and function. Copenhagen, 1950. 189–200. Wright, Q.: 
International law and the United Nations. Bombay, 1960. 7. 
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concerning the powers of the Council, albeit comprehensive, cannot be deemed 
conclusive or supportive at all cases, for instance at the determination of the 
notions used in Article 39. There was an extensive debate on the specific 
powers and their extension at the San Francisco conference, however, one line 
of argument can be seen undoubtedly; the founders had in mind an essentially 
effective and capable organization with all the necessary powers for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
 Regarding the specific powers, especially a possible legislative power of 
the Council, one particularly interesting point shall be mentioned: 
 
Numerous amendments were proposed …. All of them referred to the 
powers of the Security Council as compared with, and in relation to, the 
powers of the General Assembly. The need of determining with greater 
precision the functions and powers of the Security Council was stressed in 
many proposed amendments. Some other propositions may be briefly stated 
as follows: 
 … 
 (d) That the Security Council should not establish or modify principles 
or rules of law;18 
 
This particular proposal–among many others–was defeated during the negotia-
tions in Committee III/1. The refusal of this proposal may, however, still be 
interpreted at least in two different ways. On the one hand, it may mean that 
the founders did not find it important to add an explicit provision concerning 
such limitation, considering it as evidently inherent in the expressed provisions. 
On the other hand, especially in the context of the proposal, the founders did 
not want to establish that particular limitation on the powers of the Council. 
This interpretation may be underpinned by the fact that point (c) in the list of 
the proposals, stating “[t]hat the powers of the Security Council should be 
reduced” was also defeated. Consequently, following the principle of ‘negatio 
negationis est licitas’, the defeat of a proposed limitation logically implies the 
acceptance of the positive power, i.e. in this case the power to legislate. Beside 
that, it cannot be argued plausibly that the text of the travaux préparatoires 
would in any way imply the restriction of the Council’s powers either concerning 
the determinations in Article 39 or the nature of measures in Article 41. It can 
rather be seen that all possible specific restrictions on the powers of the 
Council were removed for the sake of efficiency, leaving only one explicit 
limitation, namely the obligation to comply with the ‘purposes and principles 
  
 18 UNCIO Docs., Vol. XI., 556. [Emphasis added.] 
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of the United Nations’. Therefore, the text of the preparatory works tends to 
support the view in favorem a possible legislative power of the Security 
Council. 
 Other means of interpretation–with growing importance–may be the appli-
cation of the doctrine of implied powers. However, some preliminary remarks 
shall be added concerning the scope and content of implied powers. To begin 
with, even the exact scope of this power is subject of constant debate. In the 
view of the supporters of a broader interpretation, as set out in the Reparation 
for Injuries opinion of the ICJ, the standard of review shall be the necessity 
of the power in relation to the duties of the organization. Nevertheless, this 
opinion was essentially aimed to describe the nature of the powers of the UN, 
but may also be applied for the organs of the UN. On the other hand, according 
to the restrictive interpretation, presented in Judge Hackworth’s dissenting 
opinion to the Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion, “implied powers flow 
from a grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those that are 'necessary' 
to the exercise of powers expressly granted”.19 The primary difference between 
the two interpretations lies within the standard itself, i.e. what shall be the 
exercise of that specific power necessary for. In order to establish a legitimate 
basis, the possible power of the Council to legislate shall be subject to both tests. 
 Another important element is that implied powers shall be ‘founded on 
powers attributed to the organization at its creation’;20 implied powers cannot 
be the result of practical development of the organization’s competences. 
Analysing the possible legislative powers of the Council in the light of implied 
powers, the first question shall be, whether legislative powers are ‘necessary’ 
or ‘essential’ for the Council to fulfil its duties under the Charter. On the one 
hand, the Council has been vested with extremely wide discretion and powers 
in order to fulfil its primary responsibility, i.e. the maintenance of international 
peace and security. As seen above, it includes the adoption of binding resolutions, 
making determinations and applying non-military or military measures if it 
deems necessary. Therefore, it might be argued that the expressed powers of 
the Council cover all the necessary means the Council needs to fulfil its tasks. 
On the other hand, this opinion has been contradicted, for instance, by the 
emergence and general acceptance concerning the rather implied power of the 
Council to organize and execute peace-keeping operations.21 Practically, it 
  
 19 Reparation for Injuries case, dissenting opinion of Judge Hackworth, ICJ Reports, 
1949. 174, at 198. 
 20 Schermers, H. G.–Blokker, N.: International Institutional Law. Leiden, 2003. 176.  
 21 See e.g., Certain Expenses opinion, ICJ Reports, 1962. 151. Khan, R.: Implied 
powers of the United Nations. Delhi, 1970. 41. 
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always depends on the requirements of a problem the Security Council has to 
face, whether its expressed powers provide all the necessary and essential 
means. If a particular issue raises the question for the Council to use means not 
explicitly provided, it shall have the power to apply other, more efficient and 
necessary means. When the Council adopted Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 
1540 (2004), it did not choose the abstract form incidentally; in the light of the 
challenges raised by the spread and danger of international terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors, its expressed 
powers did not seem sufficient enough to meet those challenges. In that case, it 
may plausibly be argued, therefore, that the exercise of legislative powers by 
the Council were at that time necessary for the fulfilment of its duties. 
Nevertheless, it shall be added that it is upon the Council to determine its own 
means, namely what measures it deems ‘necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’; however, also taking into account the limits 
set by the Charter itself. 
 An additional question shall be raised at that point concerning the broad and 
narrow interpretation of the standard, namely the need for express provision as 
basis of implied powers. Prima facie it may be argued that Articles 39 and 
41 contain these expressed powers, however, this assumption needs further 
clarification. The possible legislative powers of the Council shall be deemed 
necessary to exercise its powers to adopt non-military measures ‘to give effect 
to its decisions’ (it deems necessary) to ‘maintain or restore international peace 
and security’. Here, it is uneasy to find further arguments pro or contra, the 
choice of aspects largely depends on one’s attitude towards the extension of 
the powers of the Council. Nevertheless, as pointed out above, if the 
challenges raised by a particular security concern can only be met by adopting 
general-abstract decisions being the most proper means to ‘maintain or restore 
international peace and security’, the Council shall have the power to legislate 
in order to exercise its powers in Article 41. The reason behind the similarity 
between the arguments made concerning both the broad and narrow inter-
pretation must lie within the fact that the general purposes and functions of the 
UN are practically identical with the primary powers of the Security Council. 
It cannot be deemed too far-fetched to argue for a possible implied power of 
the Council to legislate, based upon the classic qualifications of the implied 
powers doctrine. However, I still uphold the view that the general powers or 
the purposes and principles of the organization do not necessarily provide 
sufficient legitimacy for the Council’s legislative actions. Therefore, in the 
application of both possible expressed and implied powers, specific provisions 
(containing specific, relevant powers) are to be shown in order to form a potential 
legal basis for legislative acts. In that regard, only the strict interpretation of 
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the doctrine of implied powers may be acceptable prima facie as the basis of 
further examinations. 
As it can be seen, the doctrine of implied powers may also be applied in 
connection with the establishment of legislative powers for the Council; how-
ever, this argument shall be used extremely carefully in order to avoid unlikely 
conclusions and vague legitimacy. I fully agree with those views requiring 
specific expressed powers as a legal basis for legislative acts, however, space 
shall be left for the organ concerned to fulfil its duties under those provisions. 
In that regard, latent powers shall also be taken into account. 
 
3. The ‘Subsequent Practice’ of the Security Council and the Ex Post Facto 
Observance by Member States 
 
The use of subsequent practice as means of interpretation and at the same time 
as an argument pro or contra the existence of specific powers has further 
implications. Its independent application relates to the concept of ‘assumed 
powers’. As the ICJ stated in its Certain Expenses opinion: 
 
when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United 
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organi-
zation.22  
 
On the other hand, subsequent practice may also supplement an argument pro 
implied or even inherent powers supporting the legitimisation of certain powers. 
However, in my opinion, in both cases the value of subsequent practice in that 
meaning largely depends on the attitude of the member States, namely the ex 
post facto observance or acceptance of the existence of such powers.23 
However, it shall also be added, that there are certain differences and 
ambiguities concerning the exact influence and weight of State acceptance. In 
our case, the subsequent practice of the UN Security Council shall be examined 
both pro- and retrospectively. On the one hand, it shall be analysed how 
determinant is the practice of the Council before its legislative acts on the 
scope of its powers; on the other hand, it shall also be treated, whether and 
how an emerging practice of the Council may contribute to the legitimization 
of its powers. The primary conclusion that may be drawn from the practice of 
  
 22 Certain Expenses opinion. Ibid. 168.  
 23 For this opinion see also Amerasinghe, C. F.: Principles of the institutional law of 
international organizations. 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2005. 49. 
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the Council, especially in the post-Cold War period is the clear effort to expand 
its own capabilities and powers. Starting from the often-cited political state-
ment in 1992 by the Heads of State in the Council, the Security Council never 
disguised its goals to adapt itself to the new challenges, eventually through the 
re-interpretation of fundamental concepts. This expansion of powers, obviously, 
may be best seen in the development of the Council’s Chapter VII powers.24 
 It shall be noted at this point, that in these cases the Security Council 
generally attempted to base its motion on expressed provisions and specific 
powers granted by the UN Charter. Consequently, the Council’s practice was 
and is by and large understood as the interpretation of its specific powers, and, 
at the same time, the filling in the lacunae in the text of the Charter. In my 
opinion, it is only the minority of the cases when it may be argued that, through 
its practice, the Council rather expanded and supplemented its expressed or 
implied powers. Beside that, it may also be subject of debate, whether and how 
much the Council’s post-Cold War practice was and is an expansion of its 
powers and not the exploitation of them, originally attributed to it but prevented 
by the political environment to be used for a long period of time. Therefore, 
concerning our case, the practice of the Council prior its legislative acts can 
only be interpreted properly as an evidence for further possibilities and 
capabilities and cannot be seen as determinative regarding the scope of the 
Security Council’s existing powers. In my view, taking the Council’s previous 
practice as a standard is only plausible in the permissive and not the restrictive 
meaning. Taking a specific example, the fact that the Security Council referred 
so far to specific cases concerning the determination of a ‘threat to the peace’ 
does not in any way prevent it to refer to general threats in the future, if it is 
compatible with the text of the Charter and is necessary for the restoration or 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
 The second part of the question refers to the legal value and legitimacy of 
the subsequent legislative practice by the Security Council; the examination of 
the ex post facto observance by the member States bears an essential importance 
in this regard. However, it shall be determined in advance, which factors 
generally characterize the legal value of subsequent practice. A description and 
test may be found in the ICJ’s Namibia opinion: 
 
the proceedings of the Security Council extending over a long period 
supply abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the positions taken 
by members of the Council, in particular its permanent members, have 
consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice [...]. This procedure 
  
 24 For a proper and comprehensive overview see Malone: op. cit. 
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followed by the Security Council, which has continued unchanged [...], has 
been generally accepted by Members of the United Nations and evidences a 
general practice of that Organization.25 
 
 However, this test and its standards shall be applied carefully, because 
there is a significant difference between the practices the Court referred to and 
a possible legislative practice. In the latter case, the terms ‘long period’ and 
‘continued unchanged’ practice shall be interpreted differently, considering 
that the adoption of legislative acts is not a procedural question but rather a 
substantive one. In my view, therefore, it shall not be required of all or the 
majority of the Security Council resolutions to be legislative, especially 
considering the extensive discretional power of the Council in choosing its 
own measures. Consequently, in that specific case, already a few examples 
may contribute to the existence of a practice by the Council; however, a 
general acceptance in this case would be much more difficult to prove. To see 
whether a supposed practice by the Council should be considered in itself as 
the basis of interpreting the Charter in order to include a (legislative) power, or 
there may be found other arguments underpinning this interpretation, we shall 
refer to C.F. Amerasinghe, according to whom in the former case a longer period 
of time, (i.e. several cases of legislative activity) and extensive coherency is 
required for a stable legitimacy.26  
 As pointed out above, the legitimacy of the Security Council’s practice and 
especially of a legislative practice essentially depends on the acceptance and 
observance by the member States. The attitude of the member States may be 
best shown from their statements and practical reactions or protests before, 
during and after the adoption of the resolutions in question. Regarding the first 
act, namely Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), neither the procedure 
prior the adoption of the resolution, nor the adoption procedure itself implies 
much debate. The resolution was adopted after a quite short discussion, with 
unanimity within the Council.27 Another additional element may be the compliance 
with the provisions of the resolution. As pointed out above, Resolution 1373 
(2001) established a so-called Counter-Terrorism Committee in order to 
coordinate and organize the efforts of the member States under the resolution. 
The attitude of the member States may be seen from the fact that: 
  
 25 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences… op. cit. ICJ Reports, 1971. 22. 
 26 Amerasinghe: op. cit. 51. 
 27 However, some may argue that there have been essentially political and not legal 
considerations behind this unanimity, triggered by the general sympathy after the 11 
September attacks. 
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191 states submitted first round reports called for by the resolution, self-
assessments on implementation of Resolution 1373.28 
 
 On the other hand, the case of Resolution 1540 (2004) shows a somewhat 
different approach. To begin with, prior the actual adoption there was about a 
half a year of informal and formal consultations, involving some fifty member 
States of the UN. As it may be seen from the records of two open meetings, the 
opinions of the member States concerning a possible legislative function of the 
Security Council were in many aspects entirely different.29 There were opinions 
expressly or at least implicitly recognizing a possible legislative power and 
function of the Security Council, and views expressly opposing it. However, 
not all the contributing member States have expressly addressed this question.30 
On one hand, for example, expressly accepting and supporting a legislative 
function of the Council, the representative of Switzerland stated: 
 
It is acceptable for the Security Council to assume such a legislative role 
only in exceptional circumstances and in response to an urgent need.31 
 
 Others presented a much more neutral point of view, however, still, at least 
implicitly accepting such a function, for example, the representative of South 
Africa, by stating that: 
 
The current draft resolution imposes obligations on United Nations Member 
States and attempts to legislate on behalf of States by prescribing the nature 
and type of measures that will have to be implemented by States. ... South 
Africa believes that the draft resolution could have far-reaching legal and 
practical implications for Member States,32 
  
 28 For an overview on the work of the CTC see Rosand, E.: Security Council resolution 
1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the fight against terrorism, American Journal 
of International Law, 97 (2003) 337. 
 29 For the records of the meetings see UN Doc. S/PV. 4950. Record of the Security 
Council’s 4950th meeting, Thursday, 22 April 2004, 9.50 a.m., New York, and UN Doc. 
S/PV. 4965. Record of the Security Council’s 4956th meeting, Wednesday, 28 April 2004, 
12.45 p.m., New York. 
 30 For an overview see Lavalle, R.: A novel, if awkward exercise in international law-
making: Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). Netherlands International Law Review, 
51 (2004) 425. 
 31 UN Doc. S/PV.4950, Record of the Security Council’s 4950th meeting, Thursday, 22 
April 2004, 9.50 a.m., op. cit. 28. 
 32 Ibid. 22. 
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 On the other side, there were also several opinions to be found, which 
could not accept a legislative power for the Security Council. As, for example, 
the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated: 
 The United Nations Charter entrusts the Security Council with the huge 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security, but it does not confer 
authority on the Council to act as a global legislature imposing obligations on 
States without their participation in the process. The draft resolution, in its 
present form, is a clear manifestation of the Council’s departure from its 
Charter-based mandate.33 
 As it can be seen, the adoption of legislative acts by the Security Council 
was not at all accompanied by unanimous support and acceptance; however, 
the proportions of the different opinions may have further implications. From 
the fifty-one States making a statement during the open meetings, some ten 
made an expressly opposing view against the legislative function of the Council, 
while other States either did not mention that aspect of the resolution, or accepted 
generally the urgent need and necessity to adopt the measure in question, or 
even, supported expressly a limited power of the Council to eventually adopt 
legislative acts.34 In my view, this proportion reflects a qualified majority of 
the views supporting or at least accepting (in the meaning of ‘not opposing’) 
such a function by the Council. It must be added that the supporting opinions 
also contained references that the Council should only apply its powers in 
exceptional cases when there is an existing and serious threat and there are 
gaps in the relevant international legal regulations and it is necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security to act immediately. In some 
arguments, it was also added that preferably the widest majority of the member-
ship is to be involved in the adoption of such measures, in order to ensure its 
general legitimacy. In the end, this resolution was also adopted by unanimity. 
 After the debate, one may still argue the value of member State acceptance, 
which is probably substantial. Therefore, further examples and debates are 
needed to formulate a general conclusion on the attitude of the member States; 
so far it may only be observed that the first reactions of the States may be seen 
as supportive, as long as the legislative practice of the Council remains 
exceptional. 
 
  
 33 Ibid. 32. 
 34 The determination whether an opinion is supporting or opposing, reflects the 
interpretation of the author of this study. 
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4. The Unsuitability of the Security Council–as a Political Organ– 
 to Legislate 
 
According to Judge Schwebel’s dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case: 
 
The Security Council is a political organ which acts for political reasons. It 
may take legal considerations into account but, unlike a court, it is not 
bound to apply them.35 
 
 In the view of some authors, and even member States of the UN, the essen-
tially political character of the Security Council as an organ makes it legally 
and constitutionally unsuitable to adopt legislative measures.36 There are 
arguments that the Council is generally unbound by law, consequently, it 
cannot guarantee the rule of law in its legislative function. Beside that, its lack 
of representativity and the democratic deficit of its decision-making procedure 
are also brought up against its possible legislative function. However, in my 
opinion, there are several deficiencies of these arguments. To begin with, the 
qualification of the Security Council as a political organ is generally under-
stood and mentioned in relation to the International Court of Justice as a 
judicial organ. Referring back to Judge Schwebel’s dissenting opinion, even 
his determination is based on the comparison of the Council and the Court. 
Therefore, when arguing that the Council is essentially a political organ, it 
shall be interpreted in the meaning that the Council is not suited to act as a 
court, but it does not necessarily excludes its possible capability to act as a 
legislature. Beside that, as Judge Schwebel pointed out, the Council has the 
power and the capability to ‘take legal considerations into account’ which may 
also mean that in specific cases the Council is capable to comply with the 
principle of rule of law, which may be interpreted as an evidence pro its very 
wide discretional powers regarding the elements of its decision-making.  
 The other part of its argument, namely that the Council is unbound by legal 
considerations in its decision-making, in my opinion, is rather connected with 
the problem of the lack of judicial review and the wide margin of the Council 
in making its determinations, but it does not necessarily eliminate its possible 
legislative power per se. Perhaps a more important aspect of the problem is 
  
 35 Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. USA), Merits, dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel, ICJ Reports, 1986. 90. 
[Hereinafter referred to as Nicaragua case.] 
 36 See e.g., Happold: op. cit.; E.g., Pakistan’s view prior the adoption of SC/RES/1540 
(2004), op. cit. 
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that, despite its alleged lack of representativity, the Security Council is the 
primary organ within the UN empowered to adopt binding decisions for the 
member States. The primary role of the Council is to lead the organization in 
the field of international peace and security, and to make all the necessary 
measures for its restoration or maintenance.  
 Summing up, in my opinion, based on its political nature per se, it cannot 
be stated that the Security Council may not adopt legislative acts; nevertheless, 
its practice may have constitutional and democratic deficiencies. 
 
5. Incompatibility with the Basic Principles of International Law 
 
During the open meetings before the adoption of Security Council Resolution 
1540 (2004), the representative of Japan, nevertheless generally accepting a 
possible legislative function of the Council, made an observation, which 
actually can be used as a counter-argument or an element of it: 
 
In adopting a binding Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, the Security Council assumes a lawmaking function. 
The Security Council should, therefore, be cautious not to undermine the 
stability of the international legal framework.37 
 
 At the same meeting, the representative of Cuba, generally opposing a 
legislative power of the Council, stated that: 
 
Several elements of this initiative do not correspond to the basic principles 
contained in the United Nations Charter and recognized in international 
law that prohibit interference in the internal affairs of States and the use or 
the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State.38 
 
 Another aspect of the same counter-argument may be found in Matthew 
Happold’s study: 
 
Once the Security Council starts imposing general and temporally undefined 
obligations on states, it is usurping a role that states have reserved for 
  
 37 UN Doc. S/PV. 4950, 28. op. cit. 
 38 UN Doc. S/PV. 4950, 30. op. cit.  
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themselves. Moreover, given its composition and procedures, it is doing so 
in a way that erodes the principle of sovereign equality.39 
 
 Regarding one of the main arguments, namely the prohibition of the inter-
ference with the domestic jurisdiction of the states, it can be stated that Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter expressly allows the organization and its organs to inter-
fere with the domain reservé of its member States, by adopting binding 
resolutions for them. 
 The other argument, concerning the violation of the principle of sovereign 
equality of States, needs further examination. An important element of this 
principle may be formulated that the source of obligations and rights of States 
in the international plane shall be based upon their will and consent. Here again, 
this rule may have general application, however, there are certain exceptions 
on the level of individual States. To begin with, a State may be bound by ius 
cogens norms of international law by the fact that it became a member of the 
international community. In general, a State is also bound by customary inter-
national law, even against its will, except the very narrow case of ‘persistent 
objection’. 
 In the specific case of decisions of international organization, this consent 
is implied within the accession to the constituent treaty of the organization. On 
the other hand, the fact that the Security Council as an organ with 15 members 
may adopt binding decisions for the whole organization is generally accepted 
among the member States as well as among international lawyers as a legitimate 
restriction of sovereign equality. Consequently, the question is not whether or 
not the Council may interfere with the domestic jurisdiction of its member 
States or whether it may adopt binding decisions for the whole membership 
under the general international law but whether or not the Council may adopt 
general legislative measures. The answer to this question may be affirmative if 
the UN Charter (expressly or implicitly) attributes to it legislative powers. 
 It is true that: 
 
International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are 
bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of inter-
national law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to 
which they are parties.40 
 
  
 39 Happold: op. cit. 1373. 610.  
 40 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 73 (1980) 89. 
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Nevertheless, there must be a governing principle among these obligations; based 
upon to the lex specialis derogat legis generalis principle. If the constituent 
treaty, namely the UN Charter attributes certain powers to the Organization 
which are not granted (or regulated) by general international law, the Organi-
zation shall have the power as long as it does not violate peremptory norms of 
international law.41 However, as proven by the case of other international organiz-
ations (especially by the example of the European Community), attributing 
legislative powers to an international organization per se does not in any way 
violate ius cogens. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the end, the essential question still remains: is the Security Council empow-
ered to adopt legislative measures? The question is not in any way as simple as 
it seems at a first glance. It is also far more than a semantic question concerning 
the contents of the notion of ‘legislation’; however, a different interpretation of 
the term may shorten many parts of the discussion. The underlying problem, 
namely the uncertainty concerning the parameters of a legitimate and generally 
accepted power, leaves an extremely wide margin of appreciation for the inter-
preters. The text of the UN Charter may be interpreted in many ways: from the 
aspect of State sovereignty and also from the aspect of the efficiency of the 
Organization. In my interpretation, it cannot be concluded that the provisions 
of the Charter exclude a possible legislative power of the Council. The Security 
Council has the power to adopt binding resolutions for the member States of 
the UN. Whether those shall refer to a specific situation or general “threats to 
the peace” may also form the basis of such acts, may also be disputed.  
 On the other hand, the Charter and the travaux preparatoires do not underpin 
a restrictive interpretation–this has been proven in the study. It is also of vital 
importance for a legitimate legislative function of the Council that member 
States accept and observe it, at least implicitly. Eventually it is the States that 
shall determine rules of international law–their consent is a prerequisite. This 
view does not necessarily impair with the existence of a legislative power of 
the Security Council because the consent of the member States may be found 
in their acceptance of the UN Charter and their views expressed during the 
adoption of the legislative acts in question. It is also up to the States to set up 
the limitations on the legislative powers of the Council. The sign of this 
  
 41 This principle also follows from the law of treaties, as regulated by Article 53 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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tendency may be seen in their statements referring to existing gaps in inter-
national law. 
 Whether or not a legislative power would be beneficial for the international 
community, is, however, not a legal question and may only be proved by a 
longer term of exercised practice. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the 
elaboration or exploitation of a legislative power by the Security Council will 
definitely change the quality of measures within the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.  
 
 
 
